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FOREWORD 
KAREN KNOP, RALF MICHAELS & ANNELISE RILES* 
I 
INTRODUCTION: CAVERS’S DOUBLE LEGACY 
This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems on transdisciplinary conflict 
of laws1 comes on a double anniversary. Seventy-five years ago this year, Law 
and Contemporary Problems was founded as Duke’s first law journal by David 
Cavers.2 Cavers was a strong proponent of interdisciplinary and empirical 
approaches to the law, and, in fact, Law & Contemporary Problems was 
founded as an interdisciplinary alternative to traditional law reviews.3 The 
journal has since honored this openness to interdisciplinary studies. 
Of course, Cavers was not only a proponent of interdisciplinarity; he was 
also a leading figure in conflict of laws. In 1933, the same year in which Cavers 
inaugurated Law and Contemporary Problems, he published his seminal 
“Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem,” one of the cornerstones of the early 
legal-realist critique of traditional methods in conflict of laws and still one of the 
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their work here as indicated. 
 1. Outside the United States, conflict of laws is often called “private international law.” In this 
introductory article, we will use the two terms, and the term “conflicts,” interchangeably. 
 2. See Foreword, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1933); David Cavers, Memorandum to Dean 
Miller from David F. Cavers: Suggestions with Reference to the Proposed Duke Law Review (1932); 
Proposal Leading To The Creation of Law and Contemporary Problems, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
167 (Spring 1977). 
 3. See Remarks by David F. Cavers to Duke Students Concerning the Origin of and Vision for Law 
and Contemporary Problems, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. xxiii–xxvi (Summer 1988); see also Lyman 
Brownfield, A Tribute to David Cavers, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. xvi (Summer 1988); Erwin 
Griswold, David F. Cavers, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i (Summer 1988); Maurice Rosenberg, David 
F. Cavers: Champion of Law-Related Social Research, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. vii (Summer 1988); 
Albert M. Sacks, David F. Cavers, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. v (Summer 1988); Paul Carrington, In 
Memory of David F. Cavers, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. xii (Summer 1988), as well as the letters 
contained in Some Letters from the Dean’s Files, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. xviii (Summer 1988). 
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most influential articles written on choice of law in this country.4 The journal 
has also honored this legacy in several important issues dedicated to problems 
of conflict of laws, beginning in the second year of its existence.5 
Cavers’s interest in the interdisciplinary study of law and his interest in 
conflict of laws were interconnected. He later wrote of his famous article, “In 
Wall Street, financial pillars were collapsing; in Washington, the New Deal was 
assailing old constitutional barriers; and in the law schools, the Realists were 
emerging. Past doctrines were there to be challenged. I chose choice of law.”6 In 
a similar spirit, this symposium brings together the relation between domestic 
law and foreign law, encapsulated in the conflict of laws, and the relation 
between law and other disciplines, expressed in the focus on interdisciplinarity. 
It does so at an important moment, both for conflict of laws and for 
interdisciplinarity in law. 
Conflict of laws has been relatively dormant for some time. Of course, 
scholars continually repeat the mantra that private international law is 
becoming ever more important as international transactions are ever increasing, 
the same mantra proclaimed by their predecessors in the nineteenth century. 
But there is a feeling of staleness to these proclamations, at least for North 
America.7 The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on interstate conflict of laws 
since its trilogy of cases in the 1980s;8 and its jurisprudence on the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law can safely be called erratic and lacking a 
firm conceptual basis. More is happening in the lower courts, but annual 
reports9 can do little more than map the approaches and criticize the frequently 
unsatisfactory opinions. In Canada, the Supreme Court systematically rebuilt 
much of private international law in the early 1990s in four decisions concerning 
jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, recognition of judgments, and choice of law 
in tort.10 However, the Court’s explicit rejection of all governmental-interest 
 
 4. David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933). 
 5. See 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (Summer 1935) (Migratory Divorce); 21 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 427 (Summer 1956) (The Preventive Law of Conflicts); 28 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 673 (Autumn 1963) (New Trends in the Conflict of Laws); 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. vi 
(Winter 1977) (Contemporary Perspectives in Conflict of Laws: Essays in Honor of David F. Cavers); 
50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer 1987) (Extraterritoriality of Economic Legislation); 57 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer 1994) (The Hague Conference on Private International Law). 
 6. David F. Cavers, THE CHOICE OF LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 1933–1983 4 (1985). 
 7. By contrast, one of us argues that Europe is experiencing its own conflicts revolution. See Ralf 
Michaels, The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607 (2008). 
 8. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 
(1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
 9. Most recently, Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2007: Twenty-
First Annual Survey, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 243 (2008). 
 10. See Tolofson v. Jensen; Lucas v. Gagnon, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022; Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] 4 
S.C.R. 289; Amchem Prods. Inc. v. British Columbia Workers’ Comp. Bd., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897; 
Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077. See also, e.g., Jason Herbert, The 
Conflict of Laws and Judicial Perspectives on Federalism: A Principled Defence of Tolofson v. Jensen, 
56 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 3 (1998); Robert Wai, In the Name of the International: The Supreme 
Court of Canada and the Internationalist Transformation of Canadian Private International Law, 39 
CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 117 (2001). 
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approaches to choice of law in favor of a strict, formal lex loci delicti rule in 
tort11 signified a moment of deep disillusionment for many Canadian common-
law scholars who had hoped to bring the U.S. “conflicts revolution” to private 
international law in Canada.12 
For a long time, such a feeling of staleness existed in conflict-of-laws 
scholarship, too. With some exceptions, the grand theoretical and 
methodological projects published in major law reviews had given way to 
minute analyses of specific doctrinal problems. More recently, though, the 
general trend towards interdisciplinarity has begun to spread to conflict of laws. 
Economic analysis has finally reached it. The first wave of writings was largely 
by economically oriented scholars in the United States whose background and 
main interest lay in other areas of the law and who found conflict of laws to 
border on these substantive areas—corporate law, international economic law, 
and so on.13 A second wave of work by (often non-U.S.) scholars of conflict of 
laws added further doctrinal details of private international law to the economic 
modeling.14 
The infusion of political-science analyses into private international law has 
followed a similar trajectory, though on a smaller scale. For a long time, 
invocations of political ideas in the field amounted to little more than sound 
 
 11. Tolofson v. Jensen, supra note 10. Although Tolofson did not resolve all issues of choice-of-law 
methodology, judges seem to have lost the appetite for them, leaving the approach to these remaining 
issues unrationalized and unpredictable. See Vaughan Black, The Continuing Incoherence of Canadian 
Choice-of-Law Methodology, in FRAGMENTATION: DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 34TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE CANADIAN 
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 338, 344, 346–48 (2006). 
 12. See Vaughan Black, supra note 11, at 339 (“[I]n years gone by a leading topic of conversation in 
law faculty common rooms across the country was choice of law methodology. Times have changed.”); 
John Swan, Federalism and the Conflict of Laws: The Curious Position of the Supreme Court of Canada, 
46 S.C. L. REV. 923, 948 (1995) (“A judgment written in 1994 that adopts so unequivocally the vested 
rights theory of conflicts is so unexpected that it is as if one encountered a practicing alchemist: What 
can one possibly say?”). For two telling snapshots of common-law Canada, compare Richard Risk, 
Canadian Law Teachers in the 1930s: “When the World was Turned Upside Down,” 27 DALHOUSIE L.J. 
1, 13–17 (2004) (using John Falconbridge and Moffat Hancock to track Canadian conflicts scholars’ 
alliance with the U.S. “conflicts revolution”) with Herbert, supra note 10, at 23 (describing how from a 
variety of perspectives, commentators regarded Tolofson as souring conflict of laws in Canada). 
 13. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS (2001); Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883 
(2002); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1151 (2000); Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 
1 (2001); Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government 
Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 975 (1994). 
 14. E.g., AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jürgen Basedow & 
Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006); Giesela Rühl, Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of 
Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A 
GLOBALIZED WORLD: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 153 (Eckart Gottschalk, 
Ralf Michaels, Giesela Rühl & Jan von Hein eds., 2007); Giesela Rühl, Methods and Approaches in 
Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 801 (2006); Horatia Muir Watt, 
Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A Matter of Political Economy, 9 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 383 (2003); Horatia Muir Watt, Aspects économiques du droit international privé, 25 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 307 (2004). 
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bites, and empirical research was rare.15 This may be beginning to change, in 
view of more-recent theoretical and empirical work.16 
Another interdisciplinary approach comes from legal anthropology, and, 
more specifically, from theories of legal pluralism. Paul Schiff Berman has 
drawn on these literatures to argue for an approach to conflict of laws that is 
both cosmopolitan (and thus more open than current approaches to foreign 
claims to regulation) and pluralist (and thus open to the designation of nonstate 
normative orders as applicable law).17 Gunther Teubner likewise has sought to 
draw on conflict of laws to address three core questions of systems theory: the 
nature of the conflict between different functional subsystems of society,18 the 
nature of the conflict between state law and other “quasi-legal” orders,19 and the 
nature of the conflict between different legal regimes, especially in international 
law.20 
These interdisciplinary approaches are promising, but they still stand 
somewhat isolated from each other and from the mainstream, and perhaps the 
full potential of interdisciplinarity has not yet been recognized. The goal of this 
symposium is to strengthen and deepen the growing interdisciplinary 
orientation of private international law. Accordingly, the articles in the 
symposium push the boundaries of interdisciplinarity in the field in challenging 
and sometimes surprising directions. Many are experimental in nature. Many 
bring theoretical and disciplinary perspectives to bear upon conflict-of-laws 
issues that have not before been part of the conversation. Many are written by 
scholars who do not consider themselves to be primarily conflicts experts. Many 
even reframe the goal of conflict-of-laws analysis, from solving judicial disputes 
to reflecting on the wider and deeper issues at stake in conflicts problems. 
 
 15. An exception is Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989). 
See also the criticism by Hillel Y. Levin, What Do We Really Know About the American Choice-of-Law 
Revolution?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2007) (reviewing SYMEON SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN 
CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (2006)). 
 16. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. 
L. REV. 49–93 (1989); Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance: The Politics 
of Private International Law (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Duke Univ. 2007), available at 
http://www.law.utah.edu/_personfiles/6580/whytock-dissertation-111607-final.pdf. See also Symeon 
Symeonides, supra note 16; Patrick Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357 (1992). 
 17. See Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining 
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005). 
 18. Gunther Teubner, LAW AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 100–22 (Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler 
trans., Zenon Bankowski ed., 1993); Gunther Teubner, De collisione discursuum: Communicative 
Rationalities in Law, Morality and Politics, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 901 (1996). 
 19. See Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther 
Teubner ed., 1997). For a friendly critique from within systems theory, see Ralf Michaels, The True Lex 
Mercatoria: Global Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 447 (2007). 
 20. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004). 
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II 
THEMES: INTERDISCIPLINARITY  
OF CONFLICTS AND CONFLICTS OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 
An interdisciplinary approach opens up two different themes. One is the 
familiar insight that other disciplines can both enlighten and enrich; they can 
provide new and exciting perspectives on a field. This is true for conflict of laws 
as for other legal disciplines, if not more so. The other, less-developed theme is 
the value that can come from the ensuing conflict between law and the other 
disciplines in question. 
Drawing on the articles in the symposium, this introduction surveys existing 
approaches to interdisciplinarity in conflict of laws. It distinguishes between an 
interdisciplinarity internal to the law that relates conflicts to other legal spheres 
and issue areas (II.A), and an external interdisciplinarity that engages nonlegal 
disciplines such as economics, political science, and anthropology (II.B). Later 
sections outline a number of ways in which the contributors to the symposium 
push the interdisciplinary project further: approaching the study of conflicts 
through its discourse and imagery (II.C), through the historical and present-day 
context of colonialism (II.D), and through ethnographies that detail how its 
doctrines are experienced and produced in the real world (II.E). The last 
section discusses how these and other interdisciplinary insights yielded by the 
symposium might provide a richer and more-productive concept of conflict of 
laws (II.F). It goes without saying that although each article appears under one 
heading, many of the articles relate to several of them. 
A. The Conflict within Conflicts: Public and Private 
For much of the twentieth century, private international law has been 
subjected to quite radical critique. Brainerd Currie’s exclamation that “[w]e 
would be better off without choice-of-law rules”21 is emblematic of a general 
concern. One challenge to conflict of laws is internal to the law: the decline of 
the public–private distinction. Conceived as specifically private international 
law, conflict of laws seemed ill-equipped to deal with conflicts between public 
laws, or even with the public aspects of conflicts between private laws. 
One possible consequence is critique. If indeed all law is public law, as 
standard critiques of the public–private distinction maintain, this must mean 
that conflict of laws as private international law is open to the same critique as 
was private law before: it assumes a separate private sphere that does not really 
exist; it restricts the courts’ adjudicatory power in a way that prevents courts 
from effectuating social change; it prioritizes the market over the political 
system. Much of the early realist critique of conflict of laws can be viewed in 
this light. In the first article in this symposium, Joel Paul, in scrutinizing the 
 
 21. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183 (1963). 
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recent history of the concept of comity,22 draws on this theme to mount a 
scathing critique of private international law. He lays out how comity was 
expanded in two ways to restrict the regulatory power of U.S. courts. First, 
comity turned from a mere discretionary instrument to a system of virtual 
obligations: courts were no longer free, in practice, to determine whether and 
when they could defer to foreign law; after the comity revolution they were 
reduced to following rules in doing so. Second, Paul argues, comity is no longer 
owed merely to foreign laws; now, courts owe similar deference to private 
autonomy, to the executive, and even to the global market, as evidenced in the 
recent Empagran23 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court establishing the limited 
reach of U.S. antitrust law with regard to global cartels. 
Such critique need not lead to a rejection of the field. Another response to 
the claim that the private is always already public in conflicts would be to bring 
choice of law to bear more directly on matters of public law, whether domestic 
or international. Indeed, much recent interest in the field seems to be devoted 
to such possibilities. In general, the relation of conflict of laws to domestic 
public law is being measured anew,24 as is the relationship between public and 
private international law.25 Thus, the revenue rule (“no country ever takes 
notice of the revenue laws of another”),26 buried doctrinally somewhere within 
the much maligned public-law exception to choice of law,27 now makes a 
surprise return to the center of the field. Once the embarrassment of a 
discipline otherwise proclaiming openness towards foreign law, the rule has 
assumed new significance in the context of the global fight against smuggling.28 
 
 22. Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 
(Summer 2008). 
 23. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 24. William S. Dodge, The Public-Private Distinction in the Conflict of Laws, 18 DUKE. J. COMP. 
INT’L. L. ___ (forthcoming 2008). 
 25. At the symposium underlying the present issue, Alex Mills presented his study of the history of 
private international law as a subset of international law. Alex Mills, The Private History of 
International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 1 (2006). See also Ralf Michaels, Public and Private 
International Law: German Views on Global Issues, 3 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 121 (2008) (reviewing 
VÖLKERRECHT UND IPR (Stefan Leible & Matthias Ruffert eds., 2006)); Symposium, Public and 
Private Law in the Global Adjudication System, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 253 (2008). Although 
Philip Jessup’s famous 1956 lectures on transnational law are best known for the proposition that the 
separate fields of public and private international law be merged in a single new field of “transnational 
law,” which would include all law regulating actions or events that transcend national frontiers, Jessup 
also emphasized that this would extend choice of law beyond private international law. PHILIP C. 
JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2, 106 (1956). See generally Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 738 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006). 
 26. Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B.) (per Lord Mansfield). 
 27. See Jean-Gabriel Caste, The Erosion of the Foreign Public Law Exception: Recent Canadian 
Developments, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. 
VON MEHREN 243 (James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002); William S. Dodge, 
Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161 (2002); Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the 
“Public Law Taboo” in International Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255 (1999). 
 28. Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 118 n.4 (2d Cir. 
2001); Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 544 
U.S. 1012 (2005); Joined Cases T-377/00, T-379/00, T-380/00, T-260/01 and T-272/01, Philip Morris 
International, Inc., et al. v. Comm’n of the European Communities 2003 E.C.R. II-1. See also Jürgen 
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In public international law, the proliferation of international courts and 
tribunals with sometimes overlapping jurisdictions and the growing number of 
different spheres of international law and systems of rules applicable to the 
same facts have led the United Nations International Law Commission to 
propose an “international law of conflicts.”29 Christian Joerges and others have 
made the constructive proposal to conceptualize the relationship between 
European Union Law and the law of the member states as a conflict of laws.30 
And in the current debate over the role, if any, of customary international law 
in U.S. courts, several scholars have reached for choice-of-law rules as a middle 
ground.31 
And yet two articles in this issue demonstrate that the distinction between 
public and private does not evaporate quite as easily as some commentators 
might wish, nor perhaps should it. Ralf Michaels shows how the public–private 
distinction reappears in economic analysis of conflict of laws ostensibly 
predicated on abolishing it.32 Karen Knop demonstrates the potential of the 
distinction for new and alternative ideas of private as opposed to public 
citizenship. 33 In this light, as we argue elsewhere,34 the demise of the public–
private distinction may in fact mean not the death but the growth of conflict of 
 
Basedow et al., Foreign Revenue Claims in European Courts, 6 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 1 (2004); Adrian  
Briggs, The Revenue Rule in the Conflict of Laws: Time for a Makeover, 2001 SINGAPORE J. OF LEGAL 
STUD. 280 (2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=439281; William S. Dodge, supra note 27, at 
208–19; Brenda Mallinak, The Revenue Rule: A Common Law Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 
16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 79 (2006); ED MORGAN, THE AESTHETICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
164–69 (2007). See also Audra Simpson, Subjects of Sovereignty: Indigeneity, the Revenue Rule, and 
Juridics of Failed Consent, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 191 (Summer 2008). 
 29. UN INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 at 211 (2006). But compare id. at 8 (presenting a close analogy with conflict of 
laws as apt to deal with this fragmentation of public international law) with JOOST PAUWELYN, 
CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–9 (2003) (rejecting the analogy with conflict of laws). 
 30. See, most recently, Christian  Joerges, Integration Through De-legislation? An Irritated 
Heckler 13–18 (European Governance Papers No. N-07-03, 2007), available at http://www.connex-
network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-newgov-N-07-03.pdf. See also Marc Amstutz, In-Between Worlds: 
Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal Reasoning, 11 EUR. L.J. 766 (2004); ANDREAS 
FURRER, ZIVILRECHT IM GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTLICHEN KONTEXT—DAS EUROPÄISCHE 
KOLLISIONSRECHT ALS KOORDINIERUNGSINSTRUMENT FÜR DIE EINBINDUNG DES ZIVILRECHTS IN 
DAS EUROPÄISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2001); Christoph Schmid, Vertical and Diagonal Conflicts in 
the Europeanisation Process, in PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
SUPRANATIONALISM 185 (Christian Joerges & Oliver Gerstenberg eds., 1998). 
 31. See Arthur Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE  J. INT’L 
L. 1 (1995); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 365 (2002); see also Beth Van Schaack, Boumediene and Choice of Law (June 13, 2008), 
available at http://opiniojuris.org/2008/06/13/boumediene-and-choice-of-law/. 
 32. Ralf Michaels, Economics of Law as Choice of Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (Summer 
2008). 
 33. Karen Knop, Citizenship, Public and Private, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 309 (Summer 
2008). 
 34. Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, The Fall and Rise of Private International Law: 
From Conflict of Laws to Theory of Private Global Governance (draft presented at the Globalization, 
Law & Justice Workshop, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto (Nov. 1, 2007)) (on file with authors). 
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laws. For instance, the paradigmatically public question of the status of 
prisoners held by the U.S. government at Guantánamo is being reconceived by 
some as a matter of private international law, that is, of the territorial reach of 
U.S. laws and jurisdiction.35 
Whether conflict of laws is methodologically suited to such tasks is often not 
discussed in depth. In this symposium, Jacco Bomhoff takes on these 
questions.36 He enriches the debate over the extraterritorial scope of application 
of human-rights doctrines by connecting it to the doctrine of state action and 
also to conflict of laws. What may at first sound like a curious conflation of 
three incommensurables yields fascinating insights: The territorial limits on 
governmental regulation addressed in the problem of extraterritorial human 
rights can be informed by the substantive limits on such regulation addressed in 
the state-action doctrine. And the conflict with foreign sovereigns, which the 
question of extraterritorial human rights treats as a problem of public law, can 
be linked to the conflict with foreign sovereigns regarding the applicable private 
law as addressed in the conflict of laws. In Bomhoff’s analysis, the collapsed 
public–private distinction is used not as a tool of critique but as a source of 
mutual inspiration, even a kind of interdisciplinarity within the law: after the 
collapse of the distinction between public and private, conflict of laws can 
usefully inform constitutional law, and vice versa. 
B. The Conflict between Conflicts and Other Disciplines 
The debates surveyed in the previous section concern discussions within the 
law. But much recent interest in conflict of laws goes beyond legal doctrine per 
se. Some of this interdisciplinary work comes from conflict-of-laws scholars 
who, disappointed by traditional methods, or perhaps in search of new things to 
say, import approaches from outside the law. Some such work comes from 
scholars from other disciplines altogether—economics, political science, 
anthropology—who view conflict of laws as a fruitful field for experimentation. 
Sometimes, these interdisciplinary approaches amount to little more than 
reformulations of traditional approaches in conflict of laws. Sometimes, 
however, the new perspectives open new potential for the discipline. 
One use of interdisciplinarity currently in vogue seeks to directly translate 
insights from other disciplines into substantive legal rules. Unfortunately, the 
rules that result from such translations more often than not closely resemble 
what already existed before the doctrine. For the example of law and 
 
 35. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2005); James Gathii, 
Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism, and International Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 335 (2003–2004); Kermit 
Roosevelt, III, Guantánamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017 
(2005). For commentary, see, e.g., Fleur Johns, Guantánamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception, 
16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 613 (2005); Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional 
Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073 (2005). 
 36. Jacco Bomhoff, The Reach of Rights: The “Foreign” and “The Private” in Conflict-of-Laws, 
State-Action, and Fundamental-Rights Cases with Foreign Elements, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39 
(Summer 2008). 
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economics, Ralf Michaels shows in this volume that most new economic 
analyses, at least if read as substitutes for legal doctrine, do not yield new and 
more objective solutions37 When read as doctrine, they reformulate existing 
doctrinal models, reinstating in particular the old standoff in the field between 
views privileging governmental interests and views attentive to private interests. 
When these analyses are used to resolve specific doctrinal problems—the 
applicable law in transboundary torts, the problem of characterization, the 
question whether choice-of-law rules should be formulated as rules or 
standard—they simply replicate existing doctrinal debates. 
On another level, however, such “outsider interdisciplinarity” can help both 
to highlight the specific sensitivities and rationalities existing within conflict of 
laws and to develop a new, richer and more theoretical, view of the field. Thus, 
political-science analyses draw attention to the connection between private 
international law and global governance in a way that is largely ignored by 
insider experts. At the same time, political science and political theory may 
(re)insert a political perspective into a discipline that has long been defined by 
technicalities that, ironically, are based on concepts like governmental interests 
that once carried enormous political significance. Such studies may also show 
the opposite: the political significance of these technicalities within global 
governance. If, as Michaels demonstrates in his article, economic analyses 
cannot overcome the struggle between public and private conceptions of private 
international law, this may suggest how fundamental this struggle is to the field. 
Building on this, he shows that economic analysis can highlight what traditional 
analysis ignores: the regulatory competition between legal orders, the role of 
individuals in shaping this competition, and the dependence, deliberate or not, 
of conflict-of-laws norms on the structure of the global legal system. The same 
could be said of the effort to reorganize the field of conflicts around debates in 
legal pluralism, as Annelise Riles argues in her article.38 If this effort largely 
bumps up against familiar problems and, by its own admission, ends up 
advocating already familiar doctrinal solutions, the insights of legal pluralism 
nevertheless can help develop an understanding of the sensitivities necessary to 
deal with the global legal pluralism that characterizes the situation of law in 
today’s world. 
Robert Wai’s contribution to this symposium39 also engages with legal 
pluralism. Writing in the international business context, Wai lauds accounts of 
global legal pluralism for their analyses of the growth of multiple normative 
orders and their recognition of interlegality, meaning the superimposition, 
interpenetration, and mixture of different legal spaces in both mind and action.40 
 
 37. See Michaels, supra note 32. 
 38. Annelise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273 (Summer 2008). 
 39. Robert Wai, The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 
(Summer 2008). 
 40. Id. (quoting BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 437 
(2d ed. 2002)). 
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However, Wai argues that while these accounts serve as an important corrective 
to a doctrinal focus on state norms, they overemphasize nonstate normative 
orders, for example, insisting on a purely nonstate lex mercatoria 
unrecognizable to legal practitioners. For Wai, they also miss the full extent of 
their own conception of interlegality. He proposes instead “transnational 
private law” as a frame of reference that adds private international law to 
private law, thereby reminding us of private law’s concern with relationships 
among plural and transnational normative orders, both state and nonstate. Seen 
as a decentralized and intermediate form of transnational governance, Wai’s 
notion of transnational private law also highlights his own distinct view of 
interlegality, which regards a certain degree of contestation and conflict among 
normative orders as legitimate. 
C. Discourse and Imagery of Conflicts 
The true promise of interdisciplinarity, then, is not the mere substitution of 
one discipline for another, but mutual enrichment.41 This insight becomes all the 
more important if we want to dramatically broaden the range of issues, 
questions, theoretical frameworks, methodological approaches, and historical 
and cultural contexts in which conflicts problems are analyzed. We believe the 
interdisciplinary project can be pushed further to engage a much wider range of 
methods and concerns, including, in particular, approaches that are 
noninstrumentalist in character, those that do not aim to translate immediately 
into technical solutions to doctrinal problems. A broader interdisciplinary 
approach—broader by virtue of the fact that it highlights what is left out of 
traditional conflicts analysis—demonstrates in concrete and consequential ways 
the remarkable ability of conflicts methodologies, whether by courts or by 
academics, to make what is often most pressing, most poignant, most 
epistemologically challenging and most politically and morally difficult about 
particular questions mysteriously vanish from the foreground. 
One approach to the cultural study of conflict of laws is to look at discourse 
and imagery: to bring intricate techniques of discourse analysis to bear upon the 
language of conflicts cases and scholarship. The discourse of conflict of laws can 
conceal or highlight important underlying concerns. For example, the regulation 
of cyberspace has famously been conceived as a matter of conflict of laws, in 
which the state is asked to grant comity to the allegedly autonomous normative 
 
 41. For a sampling of views on the meanings and values of interdisciplinarity in the context of 
public international law, see David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law and Policy, 12 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 9 (1999); Kenneth Abbott, Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International Law 
and Policy, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 9 (2005); David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law 
and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 9 (1999); Jan Klabbers, The Relative Autonomy of International Law 
or The Forgotten Politics of Interdisciplinarity, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 35 (2005); Gerry Simpson, 
Duelling Agendas: International Relations and International Law (Again), 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 61 
(2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual 
Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205 (1993). 
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regime of the Internet.42 Much of the ensuing debate has dealt with substantive 
questions: How different is the Internet, really, or how much deference is 
appropriate? Andrea Slane, in her article for this symposium, does not address 
these policy questions but instead focuses on the imagery used to define them.43 
She dissects the images of globalization at work in conflicts cases involving 
harms caused by postings on the Internet and demonstrates how these images 
work to produce a coherence for the field of conflicts as well as the nature of 
the Internet as a discursive space. 
Such discourse analysis bears fruit in other debates as well. For example, 
much of the debate on the legality of same-sex marriage in the United States 
now takes the form of choice-of-law analysis, a move away from the 
constitutional mandate for or against same-sex marriage to the constitutional 
mandate of states to recognize marriages entered into in other states.44 It seems 
fair to state that for most participants in the debate, conflicts is a mere end 
towards a substantive goal: proponents of same-sex marriage propagate the 
duty of states to recognize out-of-state marriages; opponents emphasize 
doctrinal conflict-of-laws arguments like the public-policy exception against 
such a duty. This substantive and instrumental focus has led scholars such as 
Gary Simson to argue that the proper space for such debates is not conflict of 
laws at all, but substantive law, and most importantly constitutional law.45 
Brenda Cossman’s article in this issue takes a very different tack. Cossman 
reads the battery of arguments at work in doctrinal debates about the 
recognition of gay and lesbian marriages alongside other images of these 
migrating marriages in television and film and in wedding announcements in the 
New York Times. At a most basic level, this cultural analysis reminds us that 
doctrinal efforts to abstract from the substance of disputes aside, substance and, 
in particular, cultural and political context continue to matter in ways that are 
often both crucial and unappreciated in the discipline. Cossman’s analysis also 
shows how the intricate moves of recognition and deference that characterize 
technical doctrinal maneuvering in the conflict of laws are actually 
consequential for the political substance of debates. The question of same-sex 
marriage is in essence one of recognition—not only by other states, but by 
publications like the New York Times with its wedding announcements, by 
society at large. Even public policy, when invoked against recognition, restricts 
 
 42. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 1367, 1391–95 (1996). 
 43. Andrea Slane, Tales, Techs, and Territories: Private International Law, Globalization, and the 
Legal Construction of Borderlessness on the Internet, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 (Summer 2008). 
 44. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES 
CROSS STATE LINES (2006). For an (already surpassed) bibliography of articles on the topic, see 
William A. Reppy, Jr., The Framework of Full Faith and Credit and Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex 
Marriages, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 393, 477–81 (2005). At the conference underlying this issue, Janet 
Halley expressed such an outsider’s interest in conflict of laws. See Janet Halley, Traveling Marriage 
(June 26, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
 45. Gary Simson, Beyond Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 40 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 313 (2006) (paper presented at the Cornell conference underlying this symposium issue). 
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same-sex marriage only in the narrow doctrinal sense. Brenda Cossman uses 
Judith Butler’s version of speech-act theory46 to think about what is “sayable” 
and not sayable in the language of conflicts. The invocation of public policy, 
Cossman shows, is also a speech act, which paradoxically reinforces the 
existence of gay and lesbian marriage as a political problem, and recognizes the 
validity of a same-sex marriage, even if elsewhere. In this sense, the question of 
the enforceability of foreign marriages cannot but be part of a wider, global 
cultural conversation—a conversation taking place through global forms of 
media as much as through global forms of law and in particular conflict of 
laws—about the politics of sexuality. 
For Nikitas Hatzimihail, likewise, a close reading of the imagery conflicts 
scholars use to describe their own doctrine tells us something important about 
the identity of the discipline itself.47 Writing on lex mercatoria, the allegedly 
autonomous law of international commerce, Hatzimihail takes as his subject not 
lex mercatoria itself or its actual history, but its frequent description as “new” in 
comparison to an “ancient” law merchant said to have flourished in medieval 
and early modern Europe. He scrutinizes different ways in which history is 
invoked to legitimate different twentieth-century notions of lex mercatoria. In 
view of the great likelihood that a historical lex mercatoria has always been a 
latter-day fabrication, these historiographies gain importance not for the past 
but for the present. 
D. Conflicts as Colonialism 
Although in its doctrines conflict of laws focuses paradigmatically on 
similarly situated states or sub-state jurisdictions, many conflicts problems are, 
in one way or another, a product of histories or present-day forms of 
colonization. Here once again conflicts can benefit from a rapprochement with 
public international law. Critical scholars of colonialism working in public 
international law have dramatically turned on its head the conventional wisdom 
that public international law is a product of European civilization and a tool of 
peace. They have shown that public international law in fact evolved principally 
out of practical problems associated with colonial domination, such as how to 
make sense of, govern, appropriate the resources of, manage, and convert what 
is “Other” to the cosmopolitan West.48 Several articles in this issue make a 
similar move with regard to private international law. 
 
 46. See JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE (1997). 
 47. Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex Mercatoria: History as Genealogy 
in International Business Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (Summer 2008). 
 48. See, e.g., ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? A 
REAPPRAISAL OF THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 43–64 (1986); 
EVE DARIAN-SMITH & PETER FITZPATRICK, LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL (1999); Nathaniel 
Berman, In the Wake of Empire, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1521 (1999); James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism, 
Colonialism, and International Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1013 (2007); Vasuki Nesiah, From Berlin to 
Bonn to Baghdad: A Space for Infinite Justice, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 75 (2004); Joel Ngugi, The 
Decolonization-Modernization Interface and the Plight of Indigenous Peoples in Post-Colonial 
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Conflicts doctrines manage political and cultural conflict involving 
overlapping and contested forms of sovereignty. Although the dominant view in 
the field often treats such conflict as conflict among equal states, in fact much of 
this conflict arises out of situations of domination, hegemony, or imperialism. In 
doctrinal terms, this is treated as irrelevant. It is just “background” to the 
technical doctrinal problem. But this context is often the engine of doctrinal 
development, and it is impossible to make sense of the doctrine without 
understanding it as a tool of colonization and also, sometimes, as a place of 
resistance to colonial authority.49 Joel Paul’s article describes how the doctrine 
of comity evolved in intimate relationship to the global debate about slavery in 
the nineteenth century.50 Most of the theories of legal pluralism discussed in the 
papers by Wai and Riles evolved out of efforts to impose foreign law on 
colonial subjects and efforts to integrate law and custom in colonial and 
postcolonial states.51 
Two articles address these issues head-on. Audra Simpson’s article concerns 
conflict-of-laws problems in cases involving the smuggling of cigarettes from the 
United States into Canada.52 In R.J. Reynolds, the best known of these cases,53 
the Canadian government brought an action in the United States against a 
cigarette manufacturer to recover lost tobacco duties and taxes and money 
spent on additional law enforcement due to an alleged conspiracy to smuggle 
cigarettes into Canada for sale on the black market. The ordinary doctrinal 
focus in these cases is the revenue rule as a vehicle for addressing conflict 
between two sovereigns—the U.S. and Canada—and between public and 
private concerns. Simpson shows how this emphasis blinds us to another, 
 
Development Discourse in Africa, 20 WISC. INT’L L.J. 297 (2002); Ileana M. Porras, Constructing 
International Law in the East Indian Seas: Property, Sovereignty, Commerce and War in Hugo Grotius’ 
De Iure Praedae—The Law of Prize and Booty, or “On How to Distinguish Merchants from Pirates,” 31 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 741 (2006). 
 49. In this vein, see Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing 
Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 430–33 (2000) (arguing that, contrary 
to the assumptions of Northern and Southern scholars alike, international commercial arbitration 
should not be viewed as the twentieth-century resurrection of the merchant tribunals of medieval 
Europe, but as the functional successor to the imperial-era system of legal capitulations and mixed 
courts in the Middle East and elsewhere that helped to consolidate international trade on terms 
favorable to European parties). 
 50. Paul, supra note 22. In the Cornell symposium underlying this issue, David Fraser surveyed and 
critiqued the approaches that courts in several countries took in their choice-of-law analysis of the 
applicability of German anti-Semitic laws. See David Fraser, “The Forces of Civilization Cannot 
Retreat”: The Public Policy Exception, the Nazis and Private International Law (April 7–8, 2006) 
(paper presented at Symposium, Rethinking the Private in Private International Law: New Methods, 
Cornell Law School) (on file with authors). For further discussion on this topic, see David Fraser, “This 
Is Not Like Any Other Legal Question”: A Brief History of Nazi Law Before U.K. and U.S. Courts, 19 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 59 (2003). See also DAVID FRASER, LAW AFTER AUSCHWITZ: TOWARD A 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE HOLOCAUST (2005). 
 51. Annelise Riles, Comparative Law and Socio-legal Studies, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 775 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2007). 
 52. Simpson, supra note 28. 
 53. Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 118 n.4 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
INTRODUCTION_BOOK PROOF_FINAL2.DOC 10/27/2008  12:34:54 PM 
14 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 71:1 
arguably more-pertinent conflict: the question of Native American sovereignty 
and of the colonial history underlying the territorial boundary between the 
United States and Canada. R.J. Reynolds involved the St. Regis–Akwesasne 
Indian Reservation on the New York border with Canada, yet this sovereignty 
question miraculously vanishes from the picture when Native American 
movements across state borders become a question of the applicability of the 
revenue rule to a dispute about cigarette smuggling. Simpson thus reminds us 
that the sovereignty question can reappear once we remind ourselves of what is 
at stake in conflict-of-laws disputes. The article highlights the dramatic erasure 
of the colonization of North America from disputes concerning the exercise of 
Native American treaty rights. 
Likewise, Teemu Ruskola shows how the United States Court for China, 
created in 1906 and abolished in 1943, was another way in which conflict of laws 
figured in the colonizers’ imposition of their own law and values elsewhere.54 
Although the court has been described as a legal curiosity—”probably the 
strangest federal tribunal ever constituted by Congress”55—Ruskola sets it 
against a history of Western powers’ assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over their citizens in non-Western countries.56 Tasked with treating China as if it 
were part of the United States, the Court fashioned its jurisprudence from laws 
including pre-independence American common law, the codes of the District of 
Columbia and the Territory of Alaska, and Chinese property law. Ruskola 
invokes theories of language, writing, and discourse to analyze both how 
American understandings of extraterritoriality make themselves blind to their 
own contradictions and their political consequences and how these doctrines 
confront, and often suppress, their own political and epistemological limits. 
E. Ethnographies of Conflicts 
Another approach to conflict-of-laws problems is ethnographic or 
interpretive. Rather than analyze the hidden grammar of the language and 
imagery of conflicts doctrine, or bring a new body of theory to bear upon 
conflicts problems, the interpretive approach paints a rich and revealing picture 
of how conflicts doctrines are experienced and produced in the real world. Its 
value is that it highlights aspects of ordinary lawmaking that may be so 
important and fundamental to the field that they ironically become too 
 
 54. Teemu Ruskola, Colonialism Without Colonies: On the Extraterritorial Jurisprudence of the 
U.S. Court for China, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217 (Summer 2008). 
 55. David J. Bederman, Extraterritorial Domicile and the Constitution, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 451, 452 
(1988). 
 56. For a discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the period 1815 to 1939, situating this system 
in the context of Western international legal theory and practice of the time, see generally, e.g., GERRY 
SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES; UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDER 227–53 (2004). 
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mundane for comment and hence are overlooked by insider-theorists and 
doctrinalists.57 
Fleur Johns’s article in this issue exemplifies this approach.58 Her article, 
informed by both theoretical erudition and experience as a former practicing 
attorney,59 gives us a richly textured picture of what “party autonomy,” a 
keystone of conflicts doctrine, actually means in the real world—how it is 
experienced, enacted, and produced—within the global culture of transnational 
dealmaking. Johns’s focus on “the deal” reveals a much richer picture of the 
actual exercise of party autonomy than what conflicts doctrine typically 
assumes. One of the insights of this approach that is particularly relevant is that 
the field of conflicts is not just a set of norms embedded in doctrine but a set of 
knowledge practices.60 
F. Towards Interdisciplinary Conflicts 
The contributions to this symposium suggest that conflict of laws, 
understood in its broader implications and context, is far from stale, but can 
actually become an exciting site for current debates. Moreover, even if 
interdisciplinarity cannot generate directly applicable rules, it can lead to more 
informed, richer, more adequate ways of doing conflict of laws. 
In her article, Annelise Riles shows how contemporary anthropological 
insights into the character of cultural difference and cultural fragmentation can 
reframe conflict-of-laws analysis in productive ways.61 Taking up the example of 
the treatment of Native American sovereignty in U.S. courts, she argues that a 
theory of conflict of laws as a discipline devoted to addressing the problem of 
cultural conflict is more doctrinally illuminating than the mainstream view of 
conflict of laws as political conflict. Rethinking these cultural conflicts through 
the prism of recent anthropological insights about culture as a problem of 
empathetic description and collaborative engagement with others, moreover, 
both reveals the importance of conflicts as a field and draws attention to aspects 
of the field’s methodology, such as the description of foreign law, that are given 
too little attention in mainstream analyses. 
Karen Knop develops private international law as the private side of 
citizenship.62 She shows that although we ordinarily think of citizenship as 
public, private international law covers some of the same ground. Private 
international law also harks back to a historical conception of the legal citizen 
 
 57. See, e.g., ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASON IN THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS (forthcoming 2008). 
 58. Fleur Johns, Performing Party Autonomy, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243 (Summer 2008). 
 59. For another such blend, see Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate 
Power Seriously in Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 416–20 (2005) 
(giving an insider perspective on a corporation’s decision regarding governing law in a contract). 
 60. Annelise Riles, The Anti-Network: Private Global Governance, Legal Knowledge, and the 
Legitimacy of the State, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2008). 
 61. Riles, supra note 38. 
 62. Knop, supra note 33. 
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as someone who could sue and be sued, and someone who belonged to a 
community of shared or common law that was not necessarily a territorial 
community. Knop demonstrates that Anglo-Canadian private international law 
has particular value as private citizenship in a post-9/11 world because its 
treatment of enemy aliens, illegal immigrants, and members of religious 
immigrant groups and other minorities offers us examples of actually existing 
cosmopolitanism within the common law. Related to Riles’s article, she 
proposes that the value of private international law for citizenship lies in its 
store of technicalities through which we can think about cosmopolitanism on 
the public side of citizenship as well. As Marianne Constable points out from 
the perspective of political theory in her afterword, the uses of conflicts in 
modern national and transnational politics is an example of the way law is now 
often prior to politics—how it not only responds to, but creates the allegiances 
and the divisions of the contemporary world. And yet the straddling of insider 
and outsider perspectives advocated in this issue also usefully keeps an 
awareness of the precise limits of doctrine and technicalities—of what law 
perhaps cannot achieve. Constable argues that what conflicts ultimately cannot 
achieve, despite its many uses, stems from the failure of all technocratic law: it 
“fails at reconciling . . . ‘is and ought.’” 
III 
CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Cavers’s ambition for this journal was that it could “become a medium for 
that correlation of the law with other social sciences concerning which so much 
is being said everywhere and so little is being done anywhere.”63 In many ways, 
this plea for interdisciplinarity has still not been fully heeded, at least as regards 
the conflict of laws. At the same time, Cavers’s plea arguably did not go far 
enough. Although the social sciences, on which he focused, are not ignored in 
this volume, many of the essays instead invoke the humanities and their 
methods and theoretical approaches to bear upon conflict-of-laws problems. 
This interdisciplinarity demonstrates and informs how conflict of laws, long 
chided as overly technical, utilizes this very technicality to address some of the 
biggest problems the law faces today, such as the character of sovereignty, the 
nature of legitimacy in situations of exceptional political conflict, the problem 
of the accommodation of cultural and political difference, the relationship 
between minorities and majorities, the relative nature of any singular set of 
values, the impact of diasporic communities on the authority of the nation-state, 
the role of state and power in defining subjects and communities, the 
relationship between global communities and local markets, or between local 
communities and global market forces, and, perhaps most generally, the global 
fragmentation and proliferation of systems of politics and values. 
 
 63. Cavers, supra note 2, at 168. 
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Much of the potential of interdisciplinarity has so far remained untapped; 
much still needs to be done. In this sense, the conclusion to this introduction 
can be no more than an overture—to the articles in this symposium issue, but 
also to further research and debate. Our hope is that over and above a number 
of individual studies, this volume showcases what is possible, both for choice of 
law and for other, extralegal, disciplines. 
